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A MOTION TO COMPEL CHANGES TO 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: HOW TO 
REMEDY THE ABUSES CONSUMERS FACE 
WHEN ARBITRATING DISPUTES 
JEREMY MCMANUS* 
Abstract: Arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution, is a favored 
method of settling legal disputes because it resolves disputes faster and more cost 
effectively than in-court litigation. Corporations often exploit the private nature 
of arbitration by including complex provisions in consumer contracts that require 
certain disputes to be resolved through arbitration. Consumers subject to these 
arbitration provisions often do not realize the existence of the provisions, and do 
not understand that because of undue corporate influence over arbitrators, arbitra-
tion tends to favor the corporations against which they arbitrate. Unfortunately, 
because the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Federal Arbitration Act 
(the “FAA”) preempts states’ ability to declare forced arbitration agreements un-
conscionable, consumers struggle to challenge unfavorable arbitration awards. To 
remedy the abuses consumers face in the arbitration arena, this Note argues that 
Congress should amend the FAA to allow states to declare forced arbitration 
agreements unconscionable. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2016, three Utah residents who had previously done bank-
ing business with Wells Fargo & Co. (“Wells Fargo”) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Utah, alleging that Wells Fargo opened bank-
ing and credit card accounts in their names without their permission.1 Accord-
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Comment Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2016–
2017. 
 1 See Associated Press, Wells Fargo Seeks Arbitration Order in Customer Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-arbitration-20161127-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/RQ82-VUVR]; Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Killing Sham Ac-
count Suits by Using Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/
06/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-killing-sham-account-suits-by-using-arbitration.html [https://perma.
cc/4RBD-3DQY]; Jim Puzzanghera, Wells Fargo Customers Harmed by Fake Accounts Would Get to 
Sue Under Proposed Legislation, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
wells-fargo-arbitration-20161201-story.html [https://perma.cc/HQ46-3X6U]. By using the personal 
information that Wells Fargo obtained when customers created legitimate accounts, Wells Fargo em-
ployees were able to sign customers up for fake accounts. See Corkery & Cowley, supra. This process 
involved Wells Fargo employees creating “fake email accounts to sign up customers for online bank-
ing services,” and “moving a small amount of money from the customer’s current account to open the 
new [account].” Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Ac-
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ing to the three customers, who have since been joined by eighty other affected 
customers, Wells Fargo employees became motivated to open the accounts 
when faced with difficult-to-reach sales targets.2 Once the employees opened 
the accounts, the affected customers were often charged fees associated with 
the unauthorized accounts; in some instances, debt collectors contacted the 
customers about those accounts.3 
Wells Fargo’s culpability for this conduct has been the subject of much 
investigation by financial regulators for the federal government, who have es-
timated that Wells Fargo employees have opened millions of unauthorized ac-
counts for existing customers since 2011.4 Based on the investigation, Wells 
Fargo agreed to pay the following amounts to avoid potential lawsuits: $100 
million to the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; $50 million to 
the City and County of Los Angeles; and $35 million to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.5 
Upon learning of the Utah lawsuit, which alleges causes of action includ-
ing breach of contract and fraud stemming from the fake accounts, on Novem-
ber 23, 2016, Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitra-
tion based on arbitration clauses found in the contracts that the customers had 
                                                                                                                           
counts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-
fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html [https://perma.cc/KUU7-B58W]. The Wells Fargo 
employees usually closed the fake accounts almost immediately, most likely because their sales tar-
gets were only contingent upon the opening of the accounts, and not upon how long the accounts 
remained open. See id. 
 2 See Corkery & Cowley, supra note 1; Stacy Cowley, Voices from Wells Fargo: ‘I Thought I 
Was Having a Heart Attack,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
10/21/business/dealbook/voices-from-wells-fargo-i-thought-i-was-having-a-heart-attack.html [https://
perma.cc/3DFD-U9ZT]. Wells Fargo employees reported being under intense pressure to meet diffi-
cult-to-reach sales goals, and feared Wells Fargo would fire them if they did not meet those goals. See 
Cowley, supra. 
 3 See Corkery, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. Wells Fargo hired an independent consultant to review millions of potentially unauthorized 
accounts that employees opened between 2011 and 2015. Id. Although Wells Fargo refunded money 
to customers if the bank had improperly charged them because of the unauthorized accounts, custom-
ers angered by the fraudulent conduct Wells Fargo employees had engaged in continued with their 
lawsuit against Wells Fargo. Id. 
 5 See id. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a federal agency that works to “protect 
consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive corporate practices and take action against companies 
that break the law” by educating consumers and corporations about consumer protection laws, and by 
filing lawsuits to enforce those laws. The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/LNG5-TQSF]. The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency “ensure[s] that national banks and federal savings associations operate in 
a safe and sound manner, provide fair access to financial services, treat customers fairly, and comply 
with applicable laws and regulations” by “[a]pprov[ing] or deny[ing] applications for new charters, 
branches, capital, or other changes in corporate or banking structure,” and issuing rules and regula-
tions. About the OCC, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/
index-about.html [https://perma.cc/9PHH-HX2H]. 
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signed for their legitimate accounts.6 Since at least 2012, Wells Fargo has re-
quired customers to consent to arbitration when they sign contracts to open 
accounts with the bank by including an arbitration provision in those con-
tracts.7 This type of arbitration is “forced arbitration” because the arbitration 
provision to which individuals are consenting is part of a larger contract, and is 
thus not the subject of independent bargaining behavior.8 Forced arbitration 
agreements often include provisions that require that all future disputes be re-
solved by way of arbitration, that the consumer waives the ability to arbitrate 
as a class, and that the arbitration comply with the rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA).9 It is likely that the Utah plaintiffs signed a forced 
arbitration agreement including these terms when they initially opened their 
legitimate banking accounts with Wells Fargo in 2012.10 
The plaintiffs in the current lawsuit were unaware that future contract dis-
putes with Wells Fargo would settle through arbitration rather than through in-
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Associated Press, supra note 1; Suzanne Barlyn, Wells Fargo Asks U.S. Court to Dismiss 
Account Scandal Lawsuit, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellsfargo-
accounts-lawsuit-idUSKBN13J1WX [https://perma.cc/V6KF-MPGK]. Arbitration is “[a] dispute-
resolution process in which the disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties to make a 
final and binding decision resolving the dispute.” Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). In the Utah Wells Fargo case, the plaintiffs sought damages for invasion of privacy, fraud, 
negligence, breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Utah Unfair Competition Act. De-
mand for Jury Trial at 1, Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2:16-cv-00966 (D. Utah Sept. 15, 2016). 
The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages due to “Wells Fargo’s failure to implement tighter securi-
ty and oversight of corporate activities, coupled with its activation of programs which not only en-
couraged the illegal activity, but also rewarded the activity . . . .” Id. at 25. 
 7 Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 15-cv-02159 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (granting defend-
ants’ motion to compel arbitration); Online Access Agreement, WELLS FARGO (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/online-banking/online-access-agreement [https://perma.cc/J45Z-BASR]. 
 8 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE ARBITRA-
TION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR 
RIGHTS 4–5 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RNP-
UZV2]; Corkery & Cowley, supra note 1. An arbitration agreement is one “by which the parties con-
sent to resolve one or more disputes by arbitration,” and “can consist of a clause in a contract or a 
stand-alone agreement and can be entered into either before a dispute has arisen between the parties (a 
predispute arbitration agreement) or after a dispute has arisen between the parties (a postdispute arbi-
tration agreement or submission agreement).” Arbitration Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). A forced arbitration agreement is an arbitration agreement that a party signs without 
realizing its existence or understanding its significance. See STONE & COLVIN, supra, at 5. 
 9 See, e.g., Online Access Agreement, supra note 7. The AAA is a non-profit organization that 
“provid[es] services to individuals and organizations who wish to resolve conflicts out of court” by 
“assisting in the appointment of mediators and arbitrators, setting hearings, and providing users with 
information on dispute resolution options . . . .” About the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), AM. ARB. ASS’N (2016) [hereinafter 
About the AAA & ICDR], https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/home? [https://perma.cc/D85S-ZZL7] (follow 
“About” hyperlink). 
 10 See Jabbari, No. 15-cv-02159; Online Access Agreement, supra note 7. A 2015 order granting 
Wells Fargo’s motion to compel arbitration shows that these provisions existed that year, increasing 
the likelihood that the Utah plaintiffs signed arbitration agreements with these terms. Jabbari, No. 15-
cv-02159. 
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court litigation.11 Assuming the plaintiffs signed forced arbitration agreements 
including these terms, arbitration would not be an appealing option for the 
plaintiffs because the arbitration provision in Wells Fargo’s legitimate banking 
contract would not permit them to arbitrate as a class, and because consumer 
arbitration is generally less fair to consumers than traditional in-court litiga-
tion.12 According to Wells Fargo, however, arbitration is simply required in this 
case; all of the plaintiffs in the Utah lawsuit signed legitimate agreements to 
arbitrate future legal disputes, and the opening of unauthorized accounts quali-
fies as a legal dispute.13 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah will have to decide 
whether the arbitration clauses found in agreements associated with the plain-
tiffs’ legitimate accounts apply to disputes arising from the creation of unau-
thorized accounts.14 Judges in other states, including a federal judge in Cali-
fornia, have previously forced Wells Fargo customers to arbitrate these dis-
putes, because of recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions that give great deference 
to the enforceability of arbitration agreements.15 These court decisions paint an 
ominous picture for the future success of the Utah plaintiffs; should the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Utah rule in accordance with these previous 
decisions, the Utah plaintiffs will lose their ability to seek justice in the court 
system.16 Instead, they will have to resolve their disputes with Wells Fargo in 
private arbitration, where corporations exert their unequal bargaining power to 
receive favorable arbitration awards.17 This will likely also mean that the 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Corkery & Cowley, supra note 1. 
 12 See id.; Online Access Agreement, supra note 7. A class is “[a] group of people, things, quali-
ties, or activities that have common characteristics or attributes.” Class, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). Class arbitration is “[a]n arbitration conducted on a representative basis similar to that 
of a class action in court, with a single person or small group of people representing the interests of a 
larger group.” Arbitration, supra note 6. In consumer class arbitration, consumers who have the same 
complaint against a large corporation choose to arbitrate their disputes together, thus splitting the costs 
associated with the arbitration. Gary Born & Claudio Salas, United States Supreme Court and Class 
Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 21, 21–22 (2012). 
 13 See Corkery & Cowley, supra note 1. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011); 
Jabbari, No. 15-cv-02159. 
 16 See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471; Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312; AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 
352. This Note infers this conclusion because the Supreme Court has set precedent for courts to en-
force arbitration agreements, including those forcing consumers to settle their legal disputes through 
arbitration rather than through court litigation. See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471; Am. Express, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2312; AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 352. 
 17 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice 
System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-
arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html?action=click&contentCollection=DealBook&
module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/6H2A-FAF7]; Jessi-
ca Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. 
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plaintiffs will lose the ability to pursue dispute resolution as a class.18 Unfortu-
nately, losing the ability to arbitrate as a class will potentially cause many 
plaintiffs to abandon their claims, because the cost of individual arbitration 
tends to outweigh consumers’ probable recoveries.19 Wells Fargo will then, in 
this circumstance, escape legal responsibility for creating fake accounts in their 
consumers’ names because it is simply too expensive for consumers to indi-
vidually pursue dispute resolution.20 
Consumers like those involved in the Wells Fargo dispute often lose the 
opportunity to resolve disputes arising from their consumer contracts in a fair 
manner when forced into arbitration.21 In general, arbitration agreements pro-
vide that if designated parties cannot resolve their legal disputes on their own, 
then a private and neutral decision-maker outside of the court system, called an 
arbitrator, must resolve the disputes.22 The use of arbitration can be appealing 
to parties to a legal contract—in the case of consumer contracts, typically large 
corporations and consumers—instead of traditional in-court litigation to re-
solve disputes arising under the contract, because arbitration can take less time 
and cost less money than traditional in-court litigation.23 Arbitration is a faster 
process and is less costly than in-court litigation because the pool of arbitrators 
to choose from is larger than a pool of available judges; therefore, parties do 
not need to accommodate a particular judge’s busy schedule.24 Additionally, 
because arbitration exists largely outside of the judiciary, time-consuming dis-
covery and evidentiary laws do not bind arbitrators.25 To settle a legal dispute 
                                                                                                                           
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/DN2Z-SAT2]. 
 18 See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 17. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
 22 See id. As long as parties have contracted to arbitrate disputes, it does not matter whether an 
agreement to arbitrate is its own contract or part of a larger contract. See id. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See Matthew M. Hoffman, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration vs. Court Litiga-
tion, TUCKER ARNSBERG, P.C. (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.tuckerlaw.com/2015/02/13/advantages-
disadvantages-arbitration-vs-court-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/R26C-AVT6]; Andrew Pincus, The 
Advantages of Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/
the-advantages-of-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/GW9H-5YGE]; Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra 
note 17. Arbitration is less costly than in-court litigation because it takes less time for a proceeding to 
occur, meaning that attorneys do not need to spend as much time appearing for preliminary hearings 
and motions, among other things. See id. Evidence can be obtained through discovery, and is “some-
thing (including testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the exist-
ence of an alleged fact; anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonex-
istence of a fact.” Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Discovery is “compulsory 
disclosure, at a party’s request, of information that relates to the litigation.” Discovery, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Evidentiary laws are ones that operate to govern the presentation of 
these facts in a legal proceeding. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 25 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
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through arbitration, the arbitrator conducts a hearing in which both sides pre-
sent evidence and make arguments to the arbitrator.26 The arbitrator then ren-
ders a binding written decision that resolves the legal conflict.27 Depending on 
the circumstances of the legal dispute, the arbitrator can also issue a monetary 
award to the prevailing party.28 Arbitrators issue monetary awards when they 
determine that, as part of the dispute resolution, one party owes money to an-
other party.29 
Although it can be efficient, the arbitration process is not always fair to 
all involved parties.30 Many consumers who have arbitrated disputes against 
large companies, such as Wells Fargo, already know that the opportunity for 
future business drives private arbitrators to be overwhelmingly partial towards 
corporations.31 In 2015, the New York Times reported, “in interviews . . . more 
than three dozen arbitrators described how they felt beholden to companies. 
Beneath every decision, the arbitrators said, was the threat of losing busi-
ness.”32 Arbitrator impartiality is not the only obstacle consumers face when 
forced into arbitration.33 Because corporations bury arbitration agreements in 
larger contracts, consumers often do not know that they agreed to arbitration in 
the first place; as such, consumers are unprepared to navigate the differences 
between arbitration and in-court litigation, such as selecting an arbitrator and 
adapting to different procedural rules.34 Furthermore, the private nature of ar-
bitration means that rules of evidence largely do not apply; thus, arbitrators—
many of whom are biased—are under no obligation to hear all of the evidence 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Consumer Legal Information: Methods for Resolving Conflicts and Disputes, OKLA. BAR 
ASS’N [hereinafter Consumer Legal Information], http://www.okbar.org/public/brochures/methods
forresolvingconflictsanddisputes.aspx [https://perma.cc/JLZ5] (last updated Aug. 2015). A panel of 
arbitrators may also resolve disputes. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
RULES 18 (2014) [hereinafter CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES], https://www.adr.org/aaa/Show
Property?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=latestreleased [https://perma.cc/5S68-JBXM]. 
The hearing lasts until the arbitrator feels that he has enough information to render a decision. See 
Consumer Legal Information, supra. 
 27 See CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 26, at 7; Consumer Legal Information, supra 
note 26. Unlike with traditional litigation decisions, arbitration decisions are largely unappealable 
under federal law. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012); Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
 28 See CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 26, at 28; Consumer Legal Information, su-
pra note 26. 
 29 See CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 26, at 28; Consumer Legal Information, su-
pra note 26. 
 30 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Jean Murray, Arbitration vs. Litigation—What Is the Difference?, THE BALANCE (Nov. 6, 
2016), https://www.thebalance.com/arbitration-vs-litigation-what-is-the-difference-398747 [https://
perma.cc/7Y3K-VMUW]; Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
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that consumers wish to present.35 Arbitrators biased towards corporations may 
choose not to hear all of a consumer’s evidence, which, if presented, would 
potentially result in a resolution favoring the consumer instead of the corpora-
tion.36 Conversely, arbitrators may allow corporations to admit evidence that 
would otherwise not be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; doing 
so would increase the chances that speculative or untrustworthy information 
influences the arbitrator’s decision in the corporation’s favor.37 Moreover, con-
sumers often lose the ability to arbitrate as a class when forced into arbitration, 
rendering the costs of arbitration greater than the potential recovery.38 Because 
of the undue influence that corporations exert in the arbitration arena, consum-
ers are ultimately at a disadvantage when arbitrating disputes against large 
corporations.39 
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the ability of large corpora-
tions to force consumers like the Utah plaintiffs into arbitration, holding that 
the FAA sets forth a pro-arbitration policy that protects this ability.40 The FAA 
provides narrow rules governing arbitration proceedings.41 The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the FAA in a way that supports the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements that prohibit consumers from arbitrating as a class; as such, con-
sumers are unable to arbitrate as a class, even when a class action is the only 
feasible way for the consumers to resolve their legal disputes.42 As a result, 
arbitration often inhibits consumers from pursuing dispute resolution because 
the costs of arbitration, such as hiring an attorney and paying the arbitrator(s), 
significantly outweigh the potential monetary award.43 
Because arbitration exists outside of the judiciary, courts are reluctant to 
overturn arbitration awards.44 Although the FAA attempts to protect the fair-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Murray, supra note 34; Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. Arbitrators only need 
to apply evidence rules to the extent that the parties agreed to their applicability ahead of time, and to 
the extent they are required for the arbitrator to avoid being “evidently partial.” See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2012); CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 26, at 25. 
 36 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
 37 See id. For example, an arbitrator could choose to let laypersons testify to opinions that experts 
provide in court proceedings under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 38 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. Consumers who cannot afford to arbitrate 
individually are therefore discouraged from continuing with the arbitration. See id. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015); Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
 41 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 42 See id.; Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471; Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312; AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 
352; Neil R. Bardack & Shannon M. Nessier, The State of Arbitration Enforcement in California, 
LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/529015/the-state-of-arbitration-enforcement-
in-calif [https://perma.cc/7YMR-UNHC]. 
 43 See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 17. 
 44 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
184 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:177 
ness of arbitration, courts prefer not to review the merits of arbitration awards 
because they view arbitration as a process that serves an invaluable role in en-
suring speedy dispute resolution and the reduction of the court system’s case-
load.45 Courts therefore do not liberally involve themselves in arbitration pro-
ceedings because such intervention would result in arbitration becoming a pre-
cursor to traditional litigation, which would ultimately burden the court system 
by increasing courts’ caseloads.46 Instead, courts become involved in arbitra-
tion only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when a party unwillingly or 
unknowingly submits to arbitration, rendering the arbitration agreement legally 
unconscionable.47 
Unfortunately, even when courts do involve themselves in arbitration, 
they are often restricted in doing so because the FAA provides only very lim-
ited circumstances where such review is appropriate.48 Such circumstances 
might include when an arbitrator is evidently partial towards one party to the 
arbitration, or when an arbitration proceeding did not conform to the procedur-
al requirements of the arbitration agreement.49 In contrast to an appellate re-
view of trial-level judicial decisions, where appellate courts have the authority 
to overturn all decisions they find to be incorrectly decided as a matter of law, 
appellate courts reviewing arbitration awards are more constrained in their 
power to overturn arbitration awards.50 Instead, appellate courts are typically 
evaluating only procedural aspects of the arbitration agreement itself, not the 
actual substance of the underlying dispute.51 Consumers who receive unfair 
arbitration proceedings and awards therefore have little success using the court 
system to remedy the injustice they experienced in arbitration.52 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993). The FAA 
expressly states that a judge may vacate an arbitration award if, among other occurrences, there is 
“evident partiality” on the part of the arbitrator. See 9 U.S.C. § 10. The FAA does not define what 
evident partiality means, and courts have interpreted it differently. Compare Scandinavian Reinsur-
ance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[e]vident partiality 
may be found only where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to 
one party to the arbitration”) (internal quotation marks omitted), and Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass 
Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[a]n arbitrator is evidently partial only if a reasona-
ble person would have to conclude that she was partial to one side”), with Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 
1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“evident partiality is present when undisclosed facts show a reasonable 
impression of partiality”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46 See Folkways Music Publishers, 989 F.2d at 111. 
 47 See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
11, 2008). 
 48 See 9 U.S.C. § 10; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
 49 See 9 U.S.C. § 10. These circumstances do not arise very often because it is hard to prove that 
an arbitrator was biased, and because corporations are careful to follow the procedures outlined in the 
contracts. Supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 50 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T Mobili-
ty, 563 U.S. at 352. 
 51 See Folkways Music Publishers, 989 F.2d at 111. 
 52 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
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Despite their limited review of arbitration awards, courts still contribute 
to the development of the legal landscape of arbitration.53 In addition to the 
very limited instances where courts may overturn arbitration awards, courts are 
also responsible for determining whether parties actually agreed to arbitrate 
their specific legal disputes.54 Arbitration agreements often state specific types 
of disputes that are subject to arbitration under the contract, and ones that are 
not.55 Much like in the Wells Fargo case, courts frequently step in to resolve 
disagreements between consumers and corporations to determine whether the 
arbitration clause covers their specific dispute.56 Additionally, courts resolve 
disagreements about how the arbitration proceeding should operate.57 For con-
sumers, however, the issue is often not that they interpreted the contract as one 
that does not subject them to arbitration for their specific dispute, but rather 
that they failed to read and comprehend the arbitration agreement altogether.58 
When arbitration agreements are clear but buried in lengthy consumer 
contracts, courts are simply unable to intervene to save the consumer from ar-
bitration because of existing Supreme Court precedent that limits the ability of 
states to overturn arbitration agreements on the legal theory of unconscionabil-
ity.59 According to the Supreme Court, the FAA sets forth a liberal federal poli-
cy favoring arbitration; state efforts to invalidate forced arbitration agreements 
on the legal theory of unconscionability undermine that policy.60 The Supreme 
Court has therefore determined that the FAA preempts the ability of state 
courts to find forced arbitration agreements unenforceable on the legal theory 
of unconscionability.61 Court involvement in arbitration ultimately does little 
to protect consumers from unfair arbitration proceedings and awards, but in-
stead has the effect of educating corporations to write arbitration agreements 
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 60 See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471; Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312; AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 
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 61 See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471; Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312; AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 
352. 
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that will not give rise to similar disputes in the future.62 The inability of the 
states to intervene in arbitration fuels the imbalance of power corporations ex-
ert over consumers in the arbitration arena.63 
Part I of this Note discusses the history and current state of arbitration law 
in the United States, and demonstrates how the federal landscape of arbitration 
has resulted in an imbalance of power between corporations and consumers in 
the arbitration arena. Part II explains the strategic corporate use of consumer 
arbitration provisions, and evaluates recent Supreme Court precedent that en-
forces forced arbitration for consumer disputes. Part II also analyzes the result-
ing harms of forced consumer arbitration, and the limited ability of state courts 
to protect consumers from unconscionable arbitration provisions. Part III ar-
gues that Congress should amend the FAA to provide states the right to declare 
forced arbitration agreements unconscionable, a change that would help level 
the playing field for consumers who seek to resolve disputes against large cor-
porations. 
I. THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Arbitration is a long-recognized method of alternative dispute resolution 
that predates the creation of the United States.64 At the time of colonization, 
the colonies of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York all legally recog-
nized arbitration as a form of dispute resolution.65 An early example of arbitra-
tion during colonial times was a provision in George Washington’s last will 
and testament declaring that any disputes regarding his estate should be re-
solved through the decision of three arbitrators.66 Since colonial times, arbitra-
tion in the United States has evolved into a prominent tool for the resolution of 
legal disputes; arbitration has only recently become a tool for the resolution of 
consumer disputes.67 Arbitration has evolved into a favorable method of dis-
pute resolution, in part because of initial steps taken by the federal government 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
 63 See id. 
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Mediation is a method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving a neutral third party who tries to 
help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution. Mediation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
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 67 See id. at 10; Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
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to provide alternative dispute resolution for labor disputes; this includes the 
eventual enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) in 1925, which 
officially gave federal authorization for parties to resolve disputes through ar-
bitration.68 The subsequent creation of organizations that work to conduct and 
oversee arbitration proceedings—such as the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA)—and certain Supreme Court decisions that have enforced the FAA’s lib-
eral federal policy in favor of arbitration have since paved the way for arbitration 
to become a dominant method for resolving consumer disputes.69 
A. Initial Steps by the Federal Government to Provide for Arbitration as a 
Source of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
The Arbitration Act of 1888 (the “Arbitration Act”) was the first federal 
law to allow for voluntary arbitration over labor disputes.70 Congress and Pres-
ident Grover Cleveland intended the Arbitration Act to adjudicate labor dis-
putes that had led to strikes on the railroad.71 To address those disputes, the 
Arbitration Act established a board of arbitrators to oversee future labor dis-
putes between the railroads and their employees.72 Arbitration under the Arbi-
tration Act was only voluntary and rarely invoked to resolve the railroad labor 
disputes, because both parties—the railroads and the laborers—preferred other 
methods of resolving legal disputes.73 
In an effort to encourage alternative dispute resolution for future labor 
disputes, Congress enacted the Erdman Act (the “Erdman Act”) in 1898, which 
promoted both mediation and arbitration for the resolution of labor disputes.74 
The Erdman Act built upon the Arbitration Act in several ways, including by 
providing a more structured process for selecting a qualified, unbiased media-
tor or arbitrator to preside over dispute resolutions.75 Although under the Erd-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Certilman, supra note 64, at 11, 12. 
 69 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T Mobility 
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man Act arbitration became a popular method of resolving labor and other le-
gal disputes, parties did not utilize arbitration to the extent Congress had in-
tended.76 
To champion the use of arbitration, Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to 
set forth a liberal federal policy supporting the enforceability and use of arbitra-
tion to settle legal disputes.77 Because courts viewed arbitration with “judicial 
hostility,” Congress implemented the FAA to prevent courts from finding all ar-
bitration agreements legally unenforceable, a practice courts had adopted from 
English common law, based on the perception that arbitration undermined court 
power.78 Therefore, to combat courts’ hostility towards arbitration, Congress en-
acted the FAA to place arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other 
contracts, where [they] belong . . . .”79 Additionally, public concerns of the cost-
liness and delays of litigation motivated Congress to encourage the use of arbi-
tration.80 As such, Congress enacted the FAA to promote a national policy favor-
ing arbitration that was applicable to state and federal courts, and to provide the 
public with a more efficient method of dispute resolution.81 
To accomplish these goals, Congress included in the FAA a specific sec-
tion establishing the “[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements 
to arbitrate.”82 Section 2 of the FAA states: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out 
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, 
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 81 See id. at 914–15. 
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and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.83 
This provision of the FAA permits the legal enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in consumer contracts.84 Section 2 therefore legally enables corporations 
to require their consumers to agree to arbitrate future contractual disputes as a 
condition of receiving the corporation’s services.85 Consumers who are unable 
to negotiate with corporations to remove the arbitration agreements from their 
consumer contracts, and consumers who need the corporation’s services be-
cause no alternatives exist, have no choice but to consent to arbitrate future 
legal disputes.86 When corporations violate service contracts, “forced arbitra-
tion” prevents consumers from seeking justice in the traditional court system 
where their opportunity for success is much greater.87 
Other sections of the FAA also accomplish Congress’s arbitration objec-
tives by providing basic rules aimed at ensuring fairness to the parties, includ-
ing permitting courts to appoint arbitrators when the parties cannot agree on a 
method to do so, and allowing courts to overturn arbitration awards where the 
arbitrator was “evidently partial.”88 Because of vague language however, the 
FAA does not answer all questions regarding how to conduct arbitration pro-
ceedings.89 For example, the FAA does not explicitly state that evidentiary 
laws are applicable to arbitration proceedings, nor does the FAA provide 
whether arbitration awards are appealable.90 Similarly, the FAA does not men-
tion any specific rules for consumer arbitrations.91 As such, individual arbitra-
tors have discretion over these specific aspects of arbitration proceedings.92 
Unfortunately, arbitrators often do not permit consumers to take advantage of 
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 91 See id. 
 92 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17. 
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all of the evidentiary rules that are available in traditional court litigation, 
which leaves consumers at a disadvantage in the arbitration arena.93 Further-
more, arbitration is largely unappealable—courts rarely decide to, or have the 
opportunity to, appeal arbitration awards—leaving consumers harmed by un-
favorable arbitration awards little to no avenue to obtain the fairness Congress 
intended them to receive through arbitration.94 
Recognizing that the FAA did not completely address all aspects of arbi-
tration, the AAA and other private organizations began providing services to 
improve arbitration in the United States.95 The AAA, founded in 1926, is a 
non-profit organization whose primary objective is to appoint arbitrators and 
establish concrete rules of arbitration by which proceedings are to abide, in-
cluding establishing rules of evidence for arbitration.96 Instead of negotiating 
every procedural detail for how to conduct future arbitrations, parties have the 
opportunity to contract to arbitrate pursuant to specific AAA procedural 
rules.97 Under the guidance of the AAA, arbitration is to proceed in a fair and 
efficient manner for all involved parties.98 
Unfortunately, arbitration in the United States has not always proceeded 
in a fair manner for all parties, even when conducted pursuant to AAA rules.99 
Corporations often exploit the private nature of arbitration to influence con-
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sumer arbitration proceedings.100 As a result, arbitration has largely resulted in 
unfair awards for consumers.101 Although the FAA and organizations like the 
AAA intend to promote fair and efficient dispute resolution, corporate domina-
tion over arbitration has resulted in just the opposite for consumers.102 
B. How Corporations Utilize the FAA and AAA Rules to  
Dominate Arbitration 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, corporations began looking for 
ways to reduce the costs associated with defending frivolous consumer-driven 
lawsuits.103 These corporations employed lawyers to determine more cost-
effective methods of resolving contractual consumer disputes.104 The corporate 
lawyers determined that forced arbitration agreements would help their corpo-
rate clients by legally requiring that consumers settle future disputes through 
arbitration rather than in-court litigation.105 By using arbitration agreements, 
corporations could force consumers out of the court system entirely, thereby 
eliminating the opportunity for expensive class action consumer lawsuits.106 
Although historically only a few corporations—such as the credit card compa-
nies American Express and First USA—employed forced arbitration agree-
ments in their consumer contracts, following the turn of the century the use of 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts has become increasingly popu-
lar.107 Today, hundreds of millions of consumer contracts contain arbitration 
provisions, including contracts with Amazon, Groupon, Netflix, Verizon and 
Wells Fargo.108 
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As corporate use of forced arbitration agreements became increasingly 
popular, the potential detriments of arbitration—namely, that corporate domi-
nation in the arbitration arena results in unequal bargaining power for consum-
ers to agree to arbitration—overshadowed many of the previous benefits par-
ties to labor arbitrations enjoyed, including time- and cost-efficiency.109 To 
ensure consumer complicity, corporations often bury arbitration agreements in 
larger consumer contracts where consumers are unlikely to see them, thereby 
forcing consumers to involuntarily contract to arbitration.110 Additionally, cor-
porations have a much better understanding of how arbitration works because 
they employ legal teams who repeatedly arbitrate consumer disputes.111 There-
fore, although intended to promote fair and efficient dispute resolution, since 
corporations have entered the arbitration arena, consumer arbitration has been 
anything but fair.112 Furthermore, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
enforced the FAA’s liberal policy favoring the enforceability of all arbitration 
agreements, despite the fairness of such agreements, consumers have little op-
portunity to challenge unfavorable and unconscionable arbitration awards.113 
Corporations have successfully exerted power over consumer arbitration 
by mandating that consumers arbitrate future legal disputes pursuant to specif-
ic AAA rules, and the rules of similar organizations.114 AAA rules are compre-
hensive and written with judicial review in mind, meaning that AAA rules 
structure arbitration proceedings in such a way that resulting arbitration awards 
will not be appealable to courts on procedural or substantive grounds.115 There-
fore, corporations often choose to arbitrate pursuant to those rules because they 
recognize that the consumers they are arbitrating against will most likely not 
have the opportunity for appeal should the corporation win the arbitration.116 
Although the AAA strives to provide rules for, and oversee, consumer ar-
bitration so that the arbitration proceedings conform to the policy of the 
FAA—namely, the promotion of fair and efficient dispute resolution—the 
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AAA is not able to entirely eliminate corporate influence over arbitration.117 
Because of their experiences with arbitration and higher knowledge of AAA 
rules—namely, due to lawyer involvement—corporations are able to utilize the 
vague nature of AAA rules to create arbitration proceedings that favor their 
own interests over those of the consumer.118 For example, in consumer arbitra-
tion, the method for selecting an arbitrator depends upon the terms of the spe-
cific contract; in many instances, either the AAA or the parties provide a list of 
names of potential arbitrators from which each party to the arbitration ranks its 
preferences.119 In those scenarios, the rankings ultimately determine the arbi-
trator.120 Alternatively, the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules state that if the 
parties cannot agree upon an arbitrator or method to select an arbitrator, the 
AAA will appoint one.121 In these scenarios, corporations are involved in de-
termining who the arbitrator(s) will be, and can exert knowledge from their 
prior experiences with arbitration to ensure that they are able to appoint favor-
able arbitrators.122 Consumers arbitrating disputes against corporations there-
fore find themselves at a marked disadvantage because the decision-maker in 
the arbitration proceeding is often not a neutral party.123As such, despite the 
AAA’s intent to promote fair arbitration proceedings, the scale is often over-
whelming tipped in favor of the corporation before the proceeding even be-
gins.124 
Congress enacted the FAA to promote fair and efficient dispute resolu-
tion, specifically through arbitration.125 The purpose of organizations such as 
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the AAA is to further that goal by dictating specific rules and procedures for 
arbitration proceedings, including consumer arbitrations.126 Unfortunately, 
corporations have found strategic ways to exploit the FAA’s liberal policy fa-
voring arbitration, as well as specific AAA rules, to dominate the consumer 
arbitration arena.127 Corporations rely on complex arbitration provisions buried 
in larger consumer contracts to force consumers to arbitrate future legal dis-
putes arising under those contracts.128 Once in arbitration, corporations exer-
cise influence over “neutral” decision makers to ensure favorable arbitration 
awards.129 Recognizing that arbitration awards are largely unappealable, corpo-
rations rest assured that consumers with whom they arbitrate are unable to 
challenge the resulting arbitration awards.130 Consumers are therefore at a seri-
ous disadvantage when forced into arbitration, and are largely unable to reme-
dy the abuses faced in the arbitration arena.131 
II. CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF THE ARBITRATION ARENA 
Despite specific issues with consumer arbitration, arbitration continues to 
serve an invaluable role in the United States by relieving the court system of 
burdensome caseloads, allowing for swift dispute resolution, and providing 
cost-effective alternatives to litigation.132 As arbitration has become a more 
prominent solution for legal disputes, however, concerns regarding the integri-
ty and neutrality of arbitration proceedings have surfaced.133 Most notably, 
there is a concern that the imbalance of power between corporations and con-
sumers allows corporations to influence arbitration proceedings to serve the 
interests of the corporations.134 For consumers, this often means unfairly and 
unjustly losing damages that they would have otherwise been able to recover 
had they been able to litigate their disputes in court.135 
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A. The Strategic Corporate Use of Consumer Arbitration Provisions 
Because of the control they are able to exert over the dispute proceedings, 
corporations tend to favor arbitration over litigation.136 As such, corporations 
strategically embed arbitration clauses into consumer contracts—recognizing 
that most consumers do not read contracts in their entirety—to force parties to 
resolve future disputes through arbitration.137 The legal terminology of these 
arbitration clauses is also often beyond what the average consumer is able to 
understand.138 Many consumers therefore agree to resolve disputes arising 
from their purchases without knowing or understanding that they are agreeing 
to do so; as a result, consumers who desire to bring lawsuits against corpora-
tions submit to unfavorable arbitration proceedings to settle their legal dis-
putes.139 
Corporations that utilize arbitration agreements typically have lawyers 
draft lengthy and complicated arbitration provisions that mandate how to settle 
consumer disputes.140 Through legal jargon that the average consumer most 
likely does not understand, these agreements often dictate how to conduct an 
arbitration proceeding, who will be the “neutral” arbitrator, and where the arbi-
tration will occur.141 Because corporations dictate the terms of arbitration, all 
of these aspects of the proceeding tend to benefit the corporations.142 For ex-
ample, corporations can select arbitrators known to rule in their favor because 
of previous business that the company has provided to those arbitrators.143 
Corporations can also select venues for arbitration that are easily accessible to 
corporate counsel, but perhaps not feasible for some consumers to access.144 
Finally, corporate lawyers drafting these arbitration provisions understand the 
rules that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) dictates, and therefore 
know how to structure the provisions to not only comply with those rules, but 
to also exploit the benefits of the rules in favor of the corporation.145 
Corporations also tend to bury arbitration agreements at the end of their 
service contracts, increasing the likelihood that consumers will not read the 
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provisions.146 For example, the contract that American Express cardholders are 
required to sign in order to activate their cards has been noted by the New York 
Times as particularly noteworthy because “[t]he section on arbitration can be 
found toward the end of the contract, which contains several thousand words 
of legal language.”147 Particularly with quick-click terms and conditions, con-
sumers often do not actually read through the conditions they are agreeing to 
when signing a contract.148 Instead, consumers just tend to “agree” because 
they know that agreeing to the terms and conditions is the only way to pur-
chase the services being offered.149 
Even if a consumer reads every provision of the terms and conditions of a 
consumer contract, he or she most likely will not understand what arbitration is, 
or what agreeing to dispute resolution through arbitration entails.150 Consumers 
often do not have the benefit of having a lawyer review the terms and conditions 
of a consumer agreement before they accept the agreement, and the language 
found in the terms and conditions can be confusing to a layperson.151 Therefore, 
many consumers do not realize that agreeing to the terms and conditions of a 
consumer contract means that they are essentially signing away the ability to 
resolve disputes in a fair and neutral manner—i.e., through litigation.152 
The terms and conditions of Netflix, a company that streams movies and 
television shows online, illustrate a prime example of the strategic corporate 
use of arbitration agreements.153 All Netflix subscribers must agree to its terms 
and conditions—which include an arbitration provision—upon subscribing 
online.154 Section 15 of the terms and conditions states: 
[i]f you are a Netflix member in the United States (including its pos-
sessions and territories), you and Netflix agree that any dispute, 
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claim or controversy arising out of or relating in any way to the Net-
flix service, these Terms of Use and this Arbitration Agreement, 
shall be determined by binding arbitration . . . .155 
The arbitration provision explicitly dictates the requirement of an arbitrator 
and the evidence to be allowed in an arbitration proceeding.156 When a Netflix 
consumer clicks the button agreeing to the terms and conditions of subscrip-
tion, the arbitration agreement is binding upon the consumer, whether or not 
the consumer actually read and understood the agreement.157 If a Netflix con-
sumer were to have a legal dispute with Netflix, the arbitration provision 
would force him or her to settle that dispute in the strategically mandated arbi-
tration process that strongly favors Netflix over the consumer.158 The imbal-
ance of power between corporations and consumers in arbitration proceedings, 
as evidenced by Netflix’s arbitration provision, is the unfortunate result of inef-
ficient rules and regulations governing arbitration in the United States.159 
B. Tipping the Scale of Bargaining Power 
The use of arbitration provisions, as currently structured in the United 
States, creates an imbalance of bargaining power between consumers and cor-
porations for a variety of reasons.160 First, corporations that frequently arbitrate 
against consumers are more knowledgeable of the arbitration arena, and can 
offer repeat business to arbitrators in exchange for ruling in favor of the corpo-
rations.161 Average consumers do not frequently arbitrate, and are therefore less 
knowledgeable about arbitration and are not similarly able to offer repeat busi-
ness to potential arbitrators.162 As such, corporations often benefit from the 
familiarity of arbitration and the partiality of arbitrators.163 Second, an inequal-
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ity in bargaining power manifests itself in the fact that the average consumer 
cannot easily acquire services without first consenting to arbitration.164 Thus, 
even to the extent that consumers know about the arbitration agreements con-
tained in their consumer contracts, consumers are not always in a position to 
be able to seek other services or bargain with corporations for more favorable 
terms and conditions.165 Therefore, many consumers sign arbitration agree-
ments with corporations that contain a number of harms including arbitrator 
impartiality, limited evidentiary rules, and less opportunity for appeal.166 
As previously discussed, one of the biggest problems facing consumers is 
the impartiality of the arbitrators selected to preside over their arbitration pro-
ceedings, which is exacerbated by the fact that courts are reluctant to declare 
arbitration provisions unconscionable.167 In addition, the private nature of arbi-
tration does not guarantee consumers the traditional rules of evidence that 
court litigation guarantees.168 Depending on the arbitration agreement, the arbi-
trator presiding over the dispute resolution often has discretion over which dis-
covery and evidentiary rules he or she will permit a consumer to employ.169 
Arbitrators unduly influenced by the prospect of future employment by corpo-
rations therefore have the discretion to limit the rules of evidence available to 
consumers.170 The lack of baseline evidentiary rules in arbitration proceedings 
disparately affects individuals forced to arbitrate consumer disputes.171 This is 
because consumers who cannot rely on baseline evidentiary rules may not be 
able to present all pieces of evidence that would be admissible in court, and 
might not be able to exclude all opposing pieces of evidence that would be in-
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admissible in court.172 Thus, not being able to rely on evidence rules negatively 
impacts consumers who attempt to arbitrate disputes with large corporations.173 
Moreover, arbitration awards are not appealable in the ways that court 
awards are appealable.174 This is because arbitration is in theory an important 
tool for courts to keep their dockets in check; as a general policy, courts do not 
want to give away this benefit by liberally reviewing arbitration proceedings.175 
If courts liberally reviewed arbitration proceedings, then arbitration would mere-
ly become an intermediate step to conventional litigation, which would increase 
the length of an already time-consuming process.176 For this reason, courts are 
inclined to limit overturning arbitration awards to extreme cases of arbitrator 
partiality, or to cases in which “corruption, fraud, or undue means” secured the 
arbitration award.177 As a result, consumers often lose substantial damages, or 
face worse financial positions because they cannot appeal their arbitration 
awards.178 The process of appeals is a vital part of the U.S. court system’s inter-
nal judicial review, because potentially three courts review each case to elimi-
nate undue influence over the result.179 Unfortunately, arbitration does not con-
tain a similar internal review, allowing corporations to influence consumer arbi-
tration awards without punishment.180 The inability to appeal arbitration awards 
therefore puts consumers at a serious disadvantage in arbitration.181 
C. State Involvement in Arbitration: How the Supreme Court Has Limited 
States’ Ability to Declare Arbitration Agreements Unconscionable 
To combat the unfairness of forced consumer arbitration agreements, 
states began nullifying them on the legal theory of unconscionability.182 Under 
the doctrine of unconscionability, a contract is unenforceable if it is both pro-
cedurally and substantively unconscionable.183 Although states may articulate 
different standards for what constitutes procedural and substantive uncon-
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scionability, California’s articulation is representative of the widely accepted 
view: “Procedural unconscionability focuses on ‘oppression or surprise due to 
unequal bargaining power,’ and substantive unconscionability focuses on 
‘overly harsh or one-sided results.’”184 Using this framework for unconsciona-
bility, in Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., the California Supreme Court struck 
down a forced arbitration agreement as unconscionable because it waived class 
arbitration.185 According to the California Supreme Court in that 2008 case, the 
forced arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because the 
class arbitration waiver allowed the corporation to avoid responsibility for 
wrongful behavior that the consumers would have addressed through class ar-
bitration, but did not have an incentive to address through individual arbitra-
tion.186 Laster is representative of how state courts applied the legal theory of 
unconscionability to nullify forced arbitration agreements in the early twenty-
first century.187 
In response to these state-led efforts to invalidate forced arbitration claus-
es on the legal theory of unconscionability, corporations began petitioning fed-
eral courts to end state interference in arbitration proceedings.188 Specifically, 
corporations wanted the federal courts to rule that the authority of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) preempts the ability of states to determine that 
forced arbitration clauses are unconscionable.189 Since 2011, corporations have 
overwhelmingly succeeded in limiting states’ ability to interfere in arbitration 
proceedings for consumer disputes, which has resulted in a major shift in pow-
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er in the consumer arbitration arena.190 Two major cases decided by the Su-
preme Court in particular have granted great deference to AAA-governed 
forced arbitration clauses, ruling that such clauses are in fact enforceable 
against consumers.191 
In 2011, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the FAA and its national policy favoring arbitration preempted a 
California common law, known as the “Discover Bank” rule, which declared 
most forced arbitration clauses unconscionable when they waived class arbitra-
tion.192 More specifically, the California Discover Bank rule invalidated forced 
consumer arbitration agreements as unconscionable when the “disputes between 
the contracting parties predictably involve[d] small amounts of damages, and 
when it [wa]s alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power ha[d] 
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money . . . .”193 The Discover Bank rule invalidated 
forced consumer arbitration agreements when consumers sought dispute resolu-
tion over a “small amount of damages” that resulted from fraudulent corporate 
behavior.194 According to the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, even though the 
Discover Bank rule contained these limitations, it still applied to “most collec-
tive-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts.”195 Therefore, most consumers in 
California were able to invoke the Discover Bank rule to invalidate arbitration 
agreements that would have forced them out of the preferred in-court system.196 
In AT&T Mobility, Vincent and Liza Concepcion sought to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement with AT&T so that they could join a class action lawsuit 
alleging that it was improper for AT&T to charge them $30.22 in sales tax on a 
cellphone that AT&T advertised as free with the purchase of cellphone ser-
vice.197 The Concepcions argued that they could forgo arbitration and join the 
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class action lawsuit under the Discover Bank rule.198 In deciding the case, the 
Supreme Court considered whether the Discover Bank rule interfered with the 
FAA’s liberal policy favoring arbitration to such an extent that the FAA 
preempted that interference.199 According to Justice Scalia, writing for the ma-
jority, “[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings. Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent 
with the FAA.”200 Permitting classwide arbitration, said Justice Scalia, takes 
away “the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the 
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass 
than final judgment.”201 Under that reasoning, the Supreme Court ruled in fa-
vor of AT&T, and denied the Concepcions’ petition to invalidate the forced 
arbitration agreement.202 
At the outset, AT&T Mobility only applied to its facts—arbitration agree-
ments that contained a class arbitration waiver.203 In 2013, in American Ex-
press Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, however, the Supreme Court extended 
AT&T Mobility to apply to other situations involving class arbitration, deter-
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mining that the FAA preempts the ability of states to declare class action arbi-
tration waivers unconscionable, even if doing so would effectively kill the le-
gal claim.204 In American Express, merchants brought a class action against 
American Express alleging that American Express’s practice of charging credit 
card fees that were thirty percent higher than the average credit card fee violat-
ed U.S. antitrust laws.205 American Express moved to settle the disputes 
through individual arbitration proceedings pursuant to the FAA.206 One plain-
tiff, the owner of the Italian Colors Restaurant in Oakland, California, attempt-
ed to invalidate the forced arbitration agreement because pursuing the claim in 
individual arbitration would cost more than what he hoped to recover in the 
lawsuit, and would therefore dissuade him from seeking resolution entirely.207 
Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, reiterated 
that state-led efforts to invalidate arbitration agreements make corporations 
less likely to use arbitration as a method of dispute resolution; the FAA there-
fore preempts those state-led efforts because they run counter to the FAA’s lib-
eral policy favoring arbitration.208 Under that reasoning, the Supreme Court 
again denied the petition to invalidate the forced arbitration agreement.209 
In 2015, the Supreme Court once again denied state efforts to declare 
forced arbitration agreements unconscionable.210 In DIRECTV, Inc. v. Im-
burgia, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted the ability of a Cali-
fornia court to find an arbitration clause unconscionable, even though the arbi-
tration agreement specifically stated that it would be unenforceable if the “law 
of your state” made the agreement unenforceable for any reason.211 In 2008, 
Amy Imburgia and Kathy Greiner sued DIRECTV, Inc. in California state 
court, alleging that DIRECTV, Inc. charged them early termination fees for 
their television services in violation of California law.212 DIRECTV, Inc. 
moved to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration provision in the consumers’ 
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service contracts.213 Ms. Imburgia and Ms. Greiner opposed the motion, point-
ing to language in the arbitration agreement that declared the entire arbitration 
agreement unenforceable if the “law of your state” found arbitration agree-
ments that waived class arbitration to be unenforceable.214 According to Ms. 
Imburgia and Ms. Greiner, the Discover Bank rule was in effect in California 
when they signed their arbitration agreements with DIRECTV, Inc., so the law 
of their state found the agreement unenforceable at the time they signed the 
agreement.215 
Writing for the majority in Imburgia, Justice Breyer stated that AT&T 
Mobility invalidated the Discover Bank rule, and therefore that rule was invalid 
at the time that Ms. Imburgia and Ms. Greiner signed their arbitration agree-
ments.216 According to Justice Breyer, “California’s interpretation of the phrase 
‘law of your state’ does not place arbitration contracts ‘on equal footing with 
all other contracts[.]’ For that reason, it does not give ‘due regard . . . to the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.’ Thus, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation 
is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act.”217 Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority, noted that a court would not interpret any other type of contract in 
such a way as to apply an invalid law, so the attempt to do so in this case 
would only serve to limit the use of arbitration.218 Because preventing the use 
of arbitration is inconsistent with the FAA’s liberal policy favoring arbitration, 
the FAA preempts the ability of California to apply invalid state law to an arbi-
tration agreement.219 Following Imburgia, consumers who signed arbitration 
agreements prior to AT&T Mobility and American Express could not retroac-
tively void the agreements, even if the contract purported to apply state law 
that was in effect before those Supreme Court decisions.220 Imburgia therefore 
left consumers with even fewer avenues to invalidate forced arbitration agree-
ments.221 
With every state-declared unconscionable arbitration clause that the Su-
preme Court overturns, consumers become less able to remove themselves 
from the effects of forced arbitration agreements.222 This means that consumers 
are, more than ever, subject to biased dispute resolution with little to no chance 
of appeal.223 Corporations are therefore increasingly able to escape liability for 
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their illegal consumer practices.224 Because consumers often have no choice 
but to obtain certain services, consumers now live in a world where they must 
contractually limit their ability to pursue dispute resolution against corpora-
tions to obtain those services.225 
Furthermore, following these Supreme Court decisions, the hurdles indi-
viduals face when forced into arbitration often make arbitrating consumer dis-
putes not worth the headache.226 Because arbitration clauses typically prevent 
consumers from arbitrating as a class, consumers experience a situation in 
which the cost of arbitrating their claims is greater than the amount of money 
in controversy.227 Although there are no reliable statistics on how many people 
choose not to arbitrate meritorious claims, between 2010 and 2014, Verizon 
Wireless faced only sixty-five consumer arbitration proceedings among its 125 
million subscribers, and Time Warner Cable faced only seven consumer arbi-
tration proceedings among its fifteen million subscribers.228 These numbers are 
shockingly low, and suggest that consumers would rather lose the amount of 
money they have in controversy with a corporation than risk losing more mon-
ey by arbitrating their legal disputes, whether or not such disputes had merit.229 
The reality that consumers are choosing not to resolve legitimate disputes 
with corporations because of the hurdles they experience during arbitration 
reinforces the argument that they are in an unfair position when it comes to all 
aspects of arbitration.230 Many consumers need the services they contract for, 
and it is a fantasy to believe that they can choose to forego a service, or use a 
different service, because that service contract contains an arbitration agree-
ment.231 Because the Supreme Court has stated that the FAA preempts the abil-
ity of states to declare forced arbitration agreements in service contracts un-
conscionable, Congress should amend the FAA to state that the FAA does not 
preempt the states from having that ability.232 
III. COMBATING THE IMBALANCE OF POWER IN CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
Consumer arbitration is problematic because it results from clauses buried 
in service contracts that consumers are unlikely to understand or even read, 
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and because corporations wield an unequal bargaining power to secure biased 
arbitrators who resolve disputes in favor of those corporations.233 Some con-
sumers may be perceptive enough to spot arbitration clauses in their contracts 
and act on that information; many however, are not.234 Although the Supreme 
Court has eliminated the ability of states to nullify such arbitration agreements 
on the grounds of unconscionability—something that states used to do with 
regularity—there are still steps that Congress can take to rectify this imbalance 
of power found in the consumer arbitration arena.235 
A. Granting Statutory Authority to the States to Declare Forced Consumer 
Arbitration Clauses Unconscionable 
Scholars have recommended that Congress amend the Federal Arbitration 
Act (the “FAA”) to rectify the above-mentioned issues associated with the Su-
preme Court’s declaration that the FAA bars states from determining that an 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable.236 To remedy these issues, scholars 
have proposed amending the FAA in several ways, including: (i) a separate 
framework for international arbitration—a recommendation prompted by the 
differences between domestic arbitration and international arbitration, and the 
need for the two systems of arbitration to develop separately from each other; 
(ii) a presumption that pre-dispute class arbitration waivers are unenforcea-
ble—a recommendation to provide consumers equal footing in the arbitration 
arena; and (iii) an overhaul of the rules regarding prehearing nonparty discov-
ery—a recommendation aimed at curing inconsistencies in arbitration and 
promoting a policy whereby arbitrators consider all relevant evidence when 
determining an arbitration award.237 Many of the scholars arguing for changes 
to the current operation of the FAA have noted that the FAA has resulted in 
                                                                                                                           
 233 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 17. 
 234 See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 17; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 17. 
 235 See Mike J. Benza, Amend the Federal Arbitration Act: A Call to Reform the Law on Mandatory 
Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 13 MAYHEW-HITE REP. ON DISP. RESOL. & CTS. 2 (2015), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/mayhew-hite/2015/03/amend-the-federal-arbitration-act/ [https://perma.
cc/478C-T6EP]; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 17. 
 236 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 8, at 25; William W. Park, Report: Amending the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 75, 77–78 (2002); Benza, supra note 235. These issues in-
clude consumers signing up for arbitration without realizing they are doing so, corporations exploiting 
their unequal bargaining power to appoint biased arbitrators when arbitrating with consumers, less 
applicability of discovery and evidence rules, and a lack of a separate framework for international 
arbitration. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 8, at 3; Park, supra, at 77–78; Benza, supra note 235. 
Scholars have noted that the FAA was unequipped to deal with all issues that could be involved with 
fair dispute resolution in the twenty-first century. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 8, at 7; Park, su-
pra, at 77–78; Benza, supra note 235. These issues include societal technological advances—ones that 
make discovery much more complicated and have changed how consumers contract for services—and 
the development of international arbitration. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 8, at 4; Park, supra, at 
77–78. 
 237 Park, supra note 236, at 77–78; Strader, supra note 78, at 910. 
2017] Providing a Level Playing Field for Consumer Arbitration 207 
serious financial consequences for consumers who fall party to consumer arbi-
tration agreements that neutral state authorities cannot review.238 
Although these scholars have proposed amendments to the FAA, none 
have focused their work exclusively on consumer arbitration.239 Therefore, this 
Note offers yet another solution aimed at making arbitration fair for consum-
ers: an amendment to the FAA expressly stating that nothing found within the 
FAA should prevent states from being able to declare forced consumer arbitra-
tion clauses unconscionable.240 The amendment, best placed at the end of Sec-
tion 2, would read, “States retain the right under this Act to invalidate all arbi-
tration agreements that are unconscionable under their state’s law.”241 To pass 
this proposed amendment, a member of the House of Representatives or the 
Senate would first be required to introduce the amendment while the House or 
the Senate is in session.242 Both the House and the Senate would then vote on 
the amendment.243 Upon a majority vote in both chambers of Congress, the 
President would then sign the amendment into law, effectively granting states 
the right to declare forced arbitration agreements unconscionable.244 
This amendment to Section 2 of the FAA is reasonable because the FAA 
does not expressly state that all arbitration agreements should be enforcea-
ble.245 Rather, the FAA simply grants parties the legal authority to contract to 
dispute resolution by arbitration.246 The Supreme Court, relying on its assess-
ment that the FAA establishes a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” 
stated that the FAA preempts the ability of states to declare forced consumer 
arbitration agreements unconscionable.247 Therefore, this proposed amendment 
to the FAA would eliminate the ability of courts to claim that this policy be-
hind the FAA preempts the ability of states to declare forced arbitration agree-
ments unconscionable.248 Furthermore, because the Supreme Court’s conclu-
sion stems from its assessment that the FAA broadly sets forth a policy favor-
ing the enforceability of all arbitration agreements and not from any express 
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language from the FAA, it would not be inconsistent with the rest of the FAA 
to amend Section 2 in this manner.249 Providing states with the ability to de-
clare forced arbitration clauses unconscionable will not discourage arbitration 
when the parties actually want to arbitrate; therefore, amending the FAA in this 
manner will not harm the FAA’s ultimate goal of encouraging fair and efficient 
arbitration.250 
This proposed amendment to Section 2 of the FAA would allow states to 
invoke state contract law to declare forced arbitration agreements, including 
those that prohibit class arbitration, unconscionable and unenforceable.251 For 
example, with this amendment to the FAA, California courts could invoke the 
Discover Bank rule to allow consumers to arbitrate as a class, especially when 
doing so is the only feasible option for dispute resolution.252 With permissible 
state review of arbitration provisions, corporations could no longer force con-
sumers into unfavorable or biased arbitration proceedings.253 Corporate influ-
ence over neutral arbitrators would be obsolete if states could review all un-
conscionable arbitration contracts.254 As such, this proposed amendment to the 
FAA would effectively even the playing field in the consumer arbitration are-
na, and would restore justice to the consumer dispute world—a world that is 
currently bleak for consumers.255 
B. What State Courts Should Look for in Declaring Forced Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements Unconscionable 
Amending the FAA to grant authority to the states to have final review of 
the enforceability of consumer arbitration agreements and consumer arbitration 
procedures would better balance the power between consumers and corpora-
tions in consumer arbitration.256 This authority would give state judiciaries 
wide latitude in determining the extent to which an arbitration agreement was 
fair to both parties to the disputed consumer contract—the consumer and cor-
poration.257 This solution also maintains the integrity and purpose of the FAA: 
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to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution and provide for the equi-
table resolution of consumer contract disputes.258 
The single most important factor in determining whether a contract is un-
conscionable is the fairness of enforcement to a particular party to the con-
tract.259 Therefore, to determine the conscionability of an arbitration agree-
ment, courts should first examine how likely it was that the consumer read the 
arbitration clause and understood what it entailed.260 The average consumer is 
often unfamiliar with the concept of arbitration, and therefore does not know 
the advantages and disadvantages of contracting to arbitrate future disputes.261 
As such, courts should weigh the consumer’s desire to agree to arbitration in 
assessing whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable.262 In assessing 
this willingness, courts should consider: (i) how prominently the corporation 
placed the arbitration clause in the contract, (ii) how accessible the language of 
the agreement is to an average layperson, and (iii) whether the consumer ex-
pressly agreed to the terms of the contract, or whether the contract was one of 
adhesion.263 For example, an arbitration clause buried in pages of legal jargon 
comprising an online contract should be presumptively unconscionable, be-
cause it is very unlikely that the consumer signing the contract knew about the 
presence of the arbitration agreement and voluntarily consented to its terms.264 
Courts should also evaluate the balance of power between the consumer 
and corporate party to an arbitration agreement.265 Corporations often dictate 
the procedures of arbitration, including the selection of the arbitrator, in their 
consumer arbitration agreements.266 Consequently, unduly-influenced arbitra-
tors end up presiding over many consumer arbitrations.267 Corporations are 
often repeat players in the consumer arbitration arena, and can thus offer repeat 
business to arbitrators who resolve contract disputes in the corporation’s fa-
vor.268 Therefore, it is important that courts examine the corporation’s ability to 
appoint biased arbitrators under the arbitration contract.269 Even if a court de-
termines that a consumer understood the arbitration agreement, it is very un-
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likely that a consumer would proactively agree to an arbitrator appointment 
method that favors the corporation.270 Courts should closely scrutinize arbitra-
tor appointment procedures under the contract, and declare unconscionable 
those contracts that contain vehicles for the corporation to tilt the arbitration 
proceeding in its favor.271 
Finally, courts should examine how the arbitration proceeding is to be 
conducted under the disputed contract, paying close attention to whether the 
lack of evidentiary or other discovery rules typically involved in traditional in-
court litigation will lead to an unfair proceeding for the consumer.272 For ex-
ample, if a corporation included in its forced arbitration clause that arbitration 
proceedings would not be subject to any evidentiary rules whatsoever, then it is 
very unlikely that the resulting proceeding will be fair to the consumer.273 If 
courts look to these specific issues when evaluating the enforceability of 
forced arbitration agreements, then such judicial review of arbitration will not 
intrude upon the FAA’s policy of encouraging and enforcing arbitration agree-
ments where the parties—consumers and corporations—intended to consent to 
arbitration, and understood the consequences of waiving dispute resolution in 
the court system.274 Rather, arbitration subject to judicial review will promote 
fair dispute resolution for both consumers and corporations, which was Con-
gress’s ultimate intent in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, but a 
goal that Congress has been unable to achieve thus far.275 
CONCLUSION 
Alternative dispute resolution, particularly arbitration, is undoubtedly a 
favored method for resolving consumer disputes for corporations across the 
United States. Arbitration is beneficial on its face because it offers time- and 
cost-effective methods for resolving these types of disputes; but, because arbi-
tration does not include many of the safeguards that traditional in-court litiga-
tion does, consumers might not always want to arbitrate their legal disputes. 
Oftentimes, however, consumers might not have a choice because corporations 
embed arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts to force consumers to 
arbitrate future legal disputes. Unfortunately, forced consumer arbitration 
clauses, as governed under current arbitration law, harm consumers who know 
little about arbitration, cannot comprehend the complex language included in 
arbitration agreements, do not understand the differences between arbitration 
and formal litigation, and fail to recognize how corporations exploit arbitration 
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to gain favorable awards. Corporations that arbitrate disputes with their con-
sumers often receive favorable arbitration awards by offering arbitrators repeat 
business and by having increased knowledge of how courts interpret the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements. Exacerbating this problem, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has eliminated the ability of states to declare these forced arbitra-
tion agreements unconscionable, a previously powerful state tool to remedy the 
unequal bargaining power of parties subject to consumer arbitration. In several 
prominent cases, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Federal Arbitration Act’s 
(the “FAA”) policy of encouraging arbitration preempts the ability of states to 
invalidate arbitration agreements that would otherwise be unconscionable un-
der state law. 
To best protect consumers and ensure that they receive fair dispute resolu-
tion proceedings, Congress should amend the FAA to expressly grant states the 
right to declare forced arbitration agreements unconscionable. This amendment 
is appropriate because nothing in the current FAA leads to a conclusion that it 
was Congress’s intention to encourage the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments that are unconscionable under state law. Furthermore, an amendment to 
the FAA to permit states to declare forced arbitration agreements unconsciona-
ble would promote fair and equitable dispute resolution, and would remedy the 
inherent imbalance of power in consumer arbitration. Because forced arbitra-
tion agreements in consumer contracts are presumably here to stay, Congress 
must provide states with a tool to protect their consumers and place them on a 
level playing field when agreeing to arbitration. 
